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I.

INTRODUCTION

Illegal immigration has become one of the most controversial
and divisive topics of our day. Proposals for comprehensive
immigration reform include amnesty, guest worker programs, open
borders, and sanctuary cities. Those who favor a strict illegal
immigration policy advocate closed borders and some form of
reduction in the numbers of illegal immigrants. Both options have
significant costs for which no one has proposed a workable
solution.
Using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been
overlooked. The IRS has an existing force of agents who conduct
investigations, collect taxes, and prosecute crimes. With extensive
databases of information and great access to businesses and
individuals through their audit functions, the IRS has the capability
to enforce the ban on hiring illegal immigrants. The IRS provides
an enforcement body that is already in place, paid for, and has the
expertise to do the job.
Most proposals to solve the problems of illegal immigration
1
have focused on the immigrants themselves. One of the big draws
of immigrating to the United States is the availability of better jobs,
1. Robert Pear & Jim Rutenbert, Senators in Bipartisan Deal on Immigration
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/05/18/washington/18immig.html?_r=1&oref=slogin.
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but for there to be jobs for illegal immigrants, there must be
employers willing to hire the illegal immigrants. If the penalties for
hiring illegal immigrants were severe enough, the number of
willing employers would drop, and the incentive to illegally enter
the United States would be diminished. For example, if provisions
similar to Internal Revenue Code section 280E that deny any
deductions to drug dealers were applied against companies that
hire illegal immigrants, there would be a greater incentive to
comply with the existing immigration laws because companies
would be required to pay taxes on gross income as opposed to net
income. In turn, these provisions could produce additional
revenue that would be available for border enforcement. Such
provisions could be very harsh to employers and to a potentially
great number of newly unemployed illegal aliens. To mitigate the
harsh result of this provision, employers could be given a choice
over a phase-in period between providing a severance package to
illegal immigrants who have been caught or the employer could be
required to pay tax on gross income.
There are many advantages to this alternative approach. First,
it puts the cost of returning the illegal immigrants to their country
on those who profited by bringing them to the United States
instead of placing the burden on the American public. Second, it
allows illegal immigrants, many of whom came to the United States
because of the availability of jobs, to return to their countries with
dignity. Instead of being jailed, tried, convicted, and deported for
illegally entering the United States, illegal immigrants would
instead be paid to return to their homelands. Moreover, because
there would be no conviction for illegal entrance, they could apply
for legal admission to the United States. Third, a severance package
would help avert a humanitarian crisis because the illegal
immigrants would be given a financial sum sufficient to re-establish
themselves in their home country. Finally, the newly passed
whistleblower rules could aid in enforcement by providing an
additional incentive to informants by rewarding people for
providing information to the IRS. Many people are aware of those
breaking the law, and making the new whistleblower rules more
public could result in additional civilians aiding in enforcing the
laws.
II. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
With an estimated ten to twenty million illegal immigrants
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2

currently in the country and thousands more arriving daily, illegal
immigration has become one of the most controversial topics of
our day, and the magnitude of the problem is increasing. The
United States has had an immigration policy for decades. The
country’s current immigration policy provides for a systematic
program of admitting immigrants into the country when the
immigrants have a job, a sponsor, a place to live, and allows them to
begin and complete a program to help them integrate into
American life. This process has been criticized as being too slow,
although the fundamentals behind the policy have generally been
viewed as sound. Despite the problems with implementation of the
policy, the United States still admits between one to two million
3
legal immigrants annually. The current policy, while roundly
criticized because of the amount of illegal immigration, has never
been given a chance to fully develop because the policy has never
been enforced.
The crux of the problem appears to be illegal immigration
rather than legal immigration. Illegal immigrants in the United
4
States now account for about one in every twenty workers. Some
2.
We estimate that of the 35.2 million immigrants in the March 2005 CPS,
between 9.6 and 9.8 million are illegal. This estimate is not significantly
different from those of other researchers who have examined this
question. It must also be remembered that these figures are only for
those in the CPS, not those missed by the survey. Our estimates indicate
that illegal aliens comprise 3.3 percent of the nation's total population
and 28 percent of the total immigrant population. Estimates prepared by
other researchers often adjust for undercount in Census Bureau data.
While there is debate about the number missed, most research indicates
that roughly 10 percent of the illegal population is not counted in the
CPS. Thus, if one wants to know the "true" size of the illegal population,
then 10 percent—or about one million illegals—should be added to our
estimate of the number captured in the CPS for a total of nearly 11
million in March 2005.
Steven A. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade: A Snapshot of America’s Foreign-Born
Population in 2005, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, Dec. 2005,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back1405.pdf
[hereinafter
Camarota,
Immigrants at Mid-Decade]; Jeffrey S. Passel, Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and
Characteristics, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, June 14, 2005, http://pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/46.pdf; Jeffrey S. Passel, Randolph Capps & Michael E. Fix,
Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures, URBAN INSTITUTE, Jan. 12, 2004,
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants _facts.pdf.
3. Cammarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade, supra note 2.
4. Steven Ohlemacher, Number of Illegal Immigrants Hits 12 Million,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS NEWSWIRE, Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.breitbart.com/
article.php?id=D8G6U2KO8 &show_article=1.
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claim that the objection to illegal immigration is due to prejudice
and hate, but those opposed to illegal immigration have a whole
litany of complaints that include the violation of our laws, lost jobs,
5
increased costs, and increased crime rates. In addition, while
enforcement of the immigration laws does not seem to be popular
among big businesses, voters continue to support immigration
6
laws, and the public outcry for the government to secure the
7
country’s borders has increased. While the need for increased
border control has become a focus in political debates, the reality
of the issue has yet to be faced—securing a 2700 mile border plus
coastlines and ports will be expensive and will require a
comprehensive new plan of its own. A proposed border control
plan might include building a fence, increasing border security,
increasing port security, increasing the detention and prison
capacities, increasing the law enforcement and judicial capacities,
including judges and lawyers, and changing the laws to impose
criminal penalties for violators. There seems to be no middle
ground between the two sides, and either alternative is costly. The
United States has had an immigration policy for decades, but
proper enforcement of the policy has been lacking. Is there a
solution, and if so, who should pay for it?
III. HISTORY OF THE IMMIGRATION LAW
There have been a number of Immigration Acts in the United
States:
A. The Naturalization Act of 1790 established the basic
8
rules for immigrants to receive naturalized citizenship.
5. Elizabeth Llorente et al., Seeking a Path to Citizenship: Rallies Make Case for
Immigration Reform, THE RECORD (New Jersey), May 2, 2007, 2007 WLNR 8296254;
Patrick McGee, Texas City Divided Over Illegal Immigration, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Jan. 27, 2007, 2007 WLNR 1736663; Ruben Navarrette, Hate in the Immigration
Debate, UNION-TRIBUNE (San Diego), July 29, 2007, available at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/op-ed/navarrette/20070729-9999-lz1e29
navarre.html.
6. Mark Krikorian, Downsizing Illegal Immigration: A Strategy of Attrition
Through Enforcement, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, May 2005, at 5,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/back605.pdf.
7. Just 26% Favor Senate Immigration Plan, RASMUSSEN REPORTS, May 23, 2007,
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/just_26_favor_senate
_immigration_plan; Poll: Americans for more border cops, not a fence; CNN, Oct. 26,
2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/24/immigration.poll/index.
html.
8. Ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). This was superseded by the
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B. The Immigration Act of 1917 barred all illiterate
immigrants over sixteen years of age and those of
diminished mental capacity and also established the
9
“Asiatic Barred Zone.”
C. The Emergency Quota Act of 1921 created quotas on
immigration based on maintaining the ratio of each
10
nationality under the 1910 census.
D. The Immigration Act of 1924 reinforced the
maintenance of the existing ratio of each nationality,
capped the number of immigrants at 150,000, and
allocated the share of the 150,000 immigrants to each
country according to the same ratio currently existing
11
in the United States.
E. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952
created the current framework for immigration and
12
citizenship in the United States. This act, which is
codified under Title 8 of the United States Code,
increased the power of the government to deport
illegal immigrants, especially those suspected of being
13
Communists.
F. The Immigration and Nationality Act amendments of
14
1965 abolished the national origin quotas. The
emphasis was changed to allow those with relatives in
the United States to immigrate, and for the first time in
Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414.
9. Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874.
10. Emergency Quota Act of 1921, 42 Stat. 5.
11. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 139, 43 Stat. 153.
The passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 resulted from a mixture of
passion and emotion; a mixture of fears and hates, tempered by idealism
and by vision, which lie behind the complex motivations of
Congressional action. We were afraid of foreigners; we distrusted them;
we didn't like them. Under this act only some one hundred and fifty odd
thousands would be permitted to enter the United States. If you were of
Anglo-Saxon origin, you could have over two-thirds of the quota numbers
allotted to your people. If you were Japanese, you could not come in at
all. That, of course, had been true of the Chinese since 1880. If you were
southern or eastern European, you could dribble in and remain on
sufferance.
EMANUEL CELLER, YOU NEVER LEAVE BROOKLYN: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF EMANUEL
CELLER (John Day Co.) (1953).
12. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163.
13. Id.
14. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89236, 79 Stat. 911.
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history, Mexican immigration was restricted.
Eventually, the INA established a preference system
that selected which ethnic groups were desirable
immigrants and placed great importance on labor
qualifications. An annual limitation of 170,000 visas
was established for immigrants from counties in the
15
Eastern Hemisphere. No more than 20,000 people
16
per country were allowed into the United States.
By 1968, the annual limitation from the Western Hemisphere
was set at 120,000 immigrants, with visas available on a first-come,
17
The number of family reunification visas,
first-serve basis.
however, was unlimited and quickly led to “chain” immigration.
This contravened the intention of family reunification visas, which
were designed to end the separation of U.S. citizens from their
families. In reality, the visas became a vehicle for allowing large
extended families to enter the United States.
The family
reunification visas became a topic of many debates throughout
Congress as well as the American public. During a debate on the
Senate floor, Senator Kennedy discussed the effects of the INA and
said, “our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants
annually” and promised that the ethnic mix in the United States
18
Prior to the INA, the United States was
would not be upset.
overwhelmingly composed of those of white European descent,
19
with blacks being the only minority group of significant size.
Since the implementation of the INA, the relative proportion of
the white population has steadily declined, with Hispanics being
the largest minority in the United States, and the number of illegal
immigrants coming to the country has increased to over one
20
million annually.
G. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. In 1965, 89 percent of the United States’ population was comprised of
those of white European descent. Id.
19. Id. Blacks comprised of 10 percent of the population in the United States
in 1968. Id.
20. Randy Capps, The Center for Children, Families, and the Law Interdisciplinary
Conference: “Welcome to America: Immigration, Families, and the Law”: U.S. Immigrant
Workers and Families: Demographics, Labor Market Participation, and Children’s
Education, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 170, 188 (2007); Robert Bernstein, U.S. Census
Bureau News, May 1, 2008, http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/
releases/archives/population/011910.html.
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(IRCA) provided for an illegal immigrant amnesty and
a ban on the employment of illegal immigrants,
actually making it a crime to hire an illegal
21
immigrant. More than 2.7 million illegal immigrants
22
IRCA also established
were granted amnesty.
financial penalties for employers employing illegal
immigrants. This law and its accompanying amnesty
were designed to fix the illegal immigration problem
once and for all.
H. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
23
Responsibility Act of 1996 made changes to the law
granting asylum, immigration detention, criminalbased immigration, and forms of immigration relief.
I. The REAL ID Act of 2005 created more restrictions on
political asylum, severely curtailed habeas corpus relief
for immigrants, increased immigration enforcement
mechanisms, altered judicial review, and imposed
federal restrictions on the issuance of state driver’s
24
licenses to immigrants.
While the U.S. Code provides for the arrest and deportation of
25
illegal immigrants found in the country, the law has not been well
enforced. Every year, illegal immigrants cross the border through
trails and tunnels, are smuggled in trucks or cars, or simply run
26
across the border. With no practical penalties or enforcement of
the existing immigration laws, there is no disincentive to illegal
immigration.
IV. LACK OF ENFORCEMENT
A. History
It is necessary to evaluate the steps taken to enforce U.S. laws
against illegal immigration, as enforcement of the nation’s
21. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100
Stat. 3359.
22. Krikorian, supra note 6, at 3.
23. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
24. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231.
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006).
26. Michael Riley, Moving Targets: Part 4, March 7, 2007, http://www.denver
post.com/fortressamerica/ci_5370888.
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immigration policies has changed dramatically over the past half27
century. For the first several years after the passage of the IRCA in
1986, illegal immigration from Mexico dropped significantly.
Some scholars indicate that the prospective illegal immigrants
waited to see if the United States was serious about enforcing its
policies as immigration from Mexico began to increase after it
became apparent that the United States was “not serious about
enforcement and that the system could be easily evaded through
28
the use of inexpensive phony documents.”
Then, in 1996, Congress engaged in another failed attempt to
enforce U.S. immigration policies by passing a law designed to
punish long term illegal residents by barring illegal immigrants
29
from future reentry for three to ten years. In actuality, Congress’s
law had little or no effect on illegal immigration as the law only
applied to people who actually left the country and then tried to
return, “but it was denounced at the time . . . as ‘radical’ and
‘draconian. . . .’ [I]n its first four years, the bar prevented fewer
30
than 12,000 people from re-entering the United States.”
Onethird of the illegal population entered the United States legally (on
31
short term or other visas) and then just never left.
In 1998, the United States, once again, made another failed
attempt at enforcing the country’s illegal immigration policies by
having the INS audit the personnel records at all the meat packing
plants in Nebraska in what was known as “Operation Vanguard,” an
32
attempt to identify illegal workers.
Of the more than 24,000 records that were checked,
approximately 4,700 contained discrepancies. The INS
asked the meatpackers to schedule those employees for
interviews during May and June of 1999. More than 1,000

27. “Fifty years ago, immigration policy may have driven immigration
numbers, but today the numbers drive policy. The non-stop increase of legal and
illegal aliens is reshaping the language and the law to dissolve any distinction
between legal and illegal immigration and, ultimately, the very idea of national
borders.” Heather Mac Donald, Crime & the Illegal Alien: The Fallout from Crippled
Immigration Enforcement, CENTER OF IMMIGRATION STUDIES, June 2004,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/back704.html.
28. Krikorian, supra note 6, at 4.
29. Jessica Vaughan, Bar None: An Evaluation of the 3/10-Year Bar, CENTER OF
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, 2003, http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1003.html.
30. Id.
31. Krikorian, supra note 6, at 4.
32. Gary Bokelmann, Illegal Aliens Routinely Go Unchecked, NEWSMAX, Nov. 9,
2001, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/11/8/184317.shtml.
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persons appeared, and all but 34 of these were able to
straighten out their records, providing missing
documentation or correcting simple errors.
But more than 3,000 simply failed to show up for
interviews and disappeared, presumably because they were
in the country illegally and thus not authorized to work.
Follow-up inspections every 90 days were intended to keep
workers from returning to their old jobs. Eventually, the
program was supposed to expand to other industries,
resulting in fewer and fewer places for illegal aliens to
33
work.
Critics, including legislators, the governor of the state, local
industry, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture labeled
“Operation Vanguard” as a failed attempt at enforcing the
34
country’s illegal immigration policies. “Operation Vanguard” has
never been repeated.
Then, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
immigration authorities undertook a “Special Registration”
program for people from Islamic countries.
The affected nation with the largest illegal-alien
population was Pakistan, with an estimated 26,000 illegals
here in 2000. Once it became clear that the government
was getting more serious about enforcing the immigration
law—at least with regard to Middle Easterners—Pakistani
illegals started leaving on their own in large numbers. The
Pakistani embassy estimated that more than 15,000 of its
35
illegal aliens left the United States . . . .
In 2002, the Social Security Administration (SSA) sent out
almost a million “no-match” letters to employers who filed W-2s
36
with information that was inconsistent with SSA’s records. The
37
purpose of the letters was to clear up misspellings, name changes,

33. Id.
34. Id. The Nebraska task force said that the program failed “in part because
of the unwillingness of the Social Security Administration to divulge Social
Security numbers.” Siskind Susser Bland’s Immigration Bulletin, Nebraska Taskforce
Releases
Recommendations
for
Operation
Vanguard,
VISALAW.COM,
http://www.visalaw.com/ 00oct3/13oct300.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
35. Krikorian, supra note 6, at 4 (citing Michael Powell, An Exodus Grows in
Brooklyn: 9/11 Still Rippling Through Pakistani Neighborhood, WASH. POST, May 29,
2003, at A1).
36. Mary Beth Sheridan, Records Checks Displace Workers: Social Security Letters
Cost Immigrants Jobs, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2002, at A1.
37. Id.
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and other mistakes that had caused a large amount of money paid
into the system to go uncredited. Many of the problems were
caused by illegal immigrants using illegal identification, “and
thousands of illegal immigrants quit or were fired when they were
found out. The effort was so successful at denying work to illegal
immigrants that business and immigrant-rights groups organized to
stop it and won a 90 percent reduction in the number of letters to
38
be sent out.”
In 2007, the Social Security Administration announced its
intention to send out “no-match” letters again. This time critics
went to court to get a restraining order. The problem with this
approach is that “no-match” letters not only identify illegal
immigrants, they also identify problems with those here legally.
Without the “no-match” letters, workers may have their
contributions not credited to their accounts. Other clerical errors
39
may also go uncorrected.
1.

Attempt to Close the Border

In 2006, President Bush outlined a multi-step, multi-faceted
immigration policy that attempted to close the United States’
immigration border. The first step was to build a fence spanning
40
almost 854 of the 1933 miles of the border. Although Congress
passed the funding bill, only eighty-six miles of the fence have been
41
built.
The cost of building and maintaining the fence is
enormous, but more troubling is the belief that it will not stop
anyone. There are tunnels constantly being found along the
border, some of which have been in operation for years without
42
detection.
The second prong of President Bush’s plan to close the border
began when Bush deployed 6000 National Guardsmen with orders
not to shoot or detain anyone but simply to support the Border

38. Kirkorian, supra note 9, at 4.
39. Ermina Karim, Employers Brace for Immigration Rules, SAN LUIS OBISPO TRIB.,
Sept. 30, 2007, http://www.alipac.us/article2603.html.
40. Eleanor Stables, Border Fence Construction Not Moving Fast Enough for Rep.
Hunter,
CQ
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
June
9,
2007,
available
at
http://public.cq.com/docs/hs/hs news110-000002547103.html.
41. Id.
42. Anna Cearley, Tunnel Entry Point Disputed, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 16,
2006,
available
at
http://ww.uniontrib.com/uniontrib/20060516/news_
1m16tunnel.html.
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43

Patrol by having additional bodies in the way. A mile is 5280 feet.
Assuming a National Guardsman could span approximately six feet
if he held his hands out (fewer as his arms began to fall from
fatigue), it would take 880 guardsmen holding hands to span just
one mile. Bush’s plan to close the border, however, turned out to
be unsuccessful, as the National Guardsmen retreated when drug
smugglers and illegal immigrants, backed by armed legal and
44
illegal Mexican nationals, approached and crossed the border.
Bush’s proposal also provided for a guest worker plan and
45
amnesty for those already in the country. Then, in June 2007, the
Senate defeated the legislation to implement the “Comprehensive
46
Immigration Reform.” A piecemeal approach was attempted in
47
October 2007, and was again defeated.
2.

Attempts to Prosecute Border Patrol Agents

In the midst of the problem with illegal immigration, some
U.S. attorneys have devoted time instead to prosecuting border
patrol agents. In one situation, border patrol agents shot a drug
smuggler in the buttocks while he was smuggling narcotics into the
United States. During the trial, the drug smuggler—who was given
immunity—was caught smuggling another shipment across the
border. The two border patrolmen were convicted and sentenced
48
In another
to eleven and twelve years in prison, respectively.

43. See
Posting
of
Think
Progress
to
Think
Progress,
http://thinkprogress.org/2007/05/25/border-patriol-to-iraq/ (May 25, 2007,
14:54 EST).
44. See Richard C. Buchanan, Border Fiasco: Guardsmen Overrun at Border,
NEWSVINE.COM, Jan. 5, 2007, http://opinion.newsvine.com/_news/2007/01/05/
507541-border-fiasco-guardsmen-overrun-at-border.
45. Craig Nelsen, Bush Amnesty Plan Raises Immigration Concerns,
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan 8, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,107692,00.
html.
46. Aaron M. Terrazas, Immigration Reform Eludes Senate, Again, MIGRATION
INFORMATION SOURCE, July 16, 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/
USfocus/display.cfm?id=611.
47. Nicole Gaouette, GOP Senators Try to Unite on Immigration Overhaul, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/
26/nation/na-immig26.
48. Elizabeth White, Border Patrol Agents’ Sentences Upheld, UNION-TRIB. (San
Diego), July 29, 2008, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/
uniontrib/20080729/news_1n29agents.html; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S.
Congressman John Culberson, Congressman Culberson Statement on Agents
Ramos
and
Compean,
Feb.
7,
2007,
http://www.culberson.house.
gov/news.aspx?A=281.
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incident, as a smuggler tried to run over a border patrolman, the
border patrolman shot out the tires of the smuggler and was found
49
guilty of violating the smuggler’s rights.
While the border
patrolmen are in prison, the enforcement of immigration policies
continues to be an issue in the United States as immigrants
continue to illegally enter the country every day. Prosecution of
border patrolmen has made the Border Patrol uneasy about doing
their job.
3.

Individual States Make Attempts to Control Illegal Immigration

The lack of effort on the part of the federal government to
take steps to enforce the immigration laws has led states to pass
legislation on their own, ultimately enabling the states to enforce
the immigration laws and protect their citizenry from increased
crime and the debilitating effects of illegal immigration on their
50
social services. One of the most noted cases involves the city of
51
Hazelton, Pennsylvania. The Hazelton ordinance prohibited the
employment and harboring of undocumented aliens, and required
apartment dwellers to obtain an occupancy permit. To receive such
a permit, they must prove they are citizens or lawful residents.
After a challenge by the American Civil Liberties Union and a
coalition of public interest groups, a federal district court declared
52
the ordinance unconstitutional.
However, the issue is far from dead. Late in 2008, the Ninth
Circuit upheld a facial challenge against an Arizona statute. “The
Arizona law, called the Legal Arizona Workers Act, targets
employers who hire illegal aliens, and its principal sanction is the
revocation of state licenses to do business in Arizona. It has yet to
53
be enforced against any employer.”
49. John MacCormack, An Immigration Ruckus in Rocksprings: City Cries “Free
Gilmer!”, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 16, 2006, http://www.mohairy.com/
FreeGilmer/Express-News.html.
50. The governor of New York, Elliott Spitzer, even attempted to give driver’s
licenses to illegal aliens. This lead to revolt by the county recorders and an effort
by state legislators to try to pass measures to stop these efforts. Press Release, N.Y.
State Executive Chamber, Dep’t of Motor Vehicles Changes License Policy to
Include More New Yorkers and Implements New Regime of Anti-fraud Measures
to
Strengthen
the
Sec.
of
the
System
(Sept.
21,
2007),
http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/0921071.html. Governor Spitzer eventually
abandoned his idea after receiving such a passionate response from the public. Id.
51. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D. Pa. 2007).
52. Id. at 554.
53. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.
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States proposed more than 1400 pieces of legislation related to
immigration between the beginning of 2007 and early July,
according to the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL). In addition, a NCSL report declared, “In the continued
absence of a comprehensive federal reform of the United States’
challenged immigration system, states have displayed an
unprecedented level of activity—and have developed a variety of
54
their own approaches and different solutions.”
According to the New York Times, “[e]very state debated
immigration issues, and 41 states adopted immigration laws. A
large number of new laws cracked down on employers who hire
55
illegal immigrants.”
4.

Attempts by Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents

Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents have recently
56
invaded meat packing operations in several states. As a result,
illegal immigrants and potential identity thieves have been
arrested, and wages in the meat-packing industry have dropped
57
from an average hourly wage of $17.41 in 1976 to $11.47 in 2006.
When the union was interviewed, however, it was revealed that the
new source of illegal immigrants posed a new source of union dues;
58
therefore, they actually supported the illegal immigrants. A lawsuit
59
by employees against their union is still pending.

2008).
54. Walter F. Roche Jr., Number of State-Level Immigration Laws is Growing—Some
Experts Say Washington Inaction Has Led to the Rise of the Localized Legislation, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at A-15, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/
aug/06/nation/na-immig6.
55. Julia Preston, Surge in Immigration Laws Around U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2007, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/washington/
06immig.html?_r=1.
56. Nicole Gauoette, Six Meat Plants are Raided in Massive I.D. Theft Case;
Swift and Co.Workers are Accused of Immigration Violations and Using Stolen
Social Security Numbers, L.A. TIMES, Dec.13, 2006, at A18.
57. Meatpacking in the U.S.: Still a “Jungle” Out There?, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/now/ shows/250/meat-packing.html(last visited, Sept. 19,
2008).
58. See generally Julia Preston, After Iowa Raid, Immigrants Fuel Labor Inquiries,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/us/27immig.
html#.
59. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/4

14

Black et al.: Is the IRS the Solution to Illegal Immigration?

2008]

IRS: IMMIGRATION SOLUTION?

323

B. Practicalities–The Alternative to Amnesty
The failure to control illegal immigration adequately has
caused another problem—a large number of illegal immigrants
already living in the country continue to wait in limbo. While the
idea of granting amnesty is disfavored by many Americans, the
alternative to amnesty is seldom discussed. First, to gather an
estimated ten to twenty million people would be a daunting task.
Second, finding space to process so many people would be
extremely challenging. Large football stadiums or convention halls
range from a seating capacity of 20,000 to 60,000. Twenty million
people would fill 1000 of the 20,000 seat stadiums. In short, twenty
stadiums per state would need to be filled. Furthermore, sending
twenty million people back to Mexico or various other countries of
origin would create a humanitarian crisis and a potential public
relations nightmare. America is complaining about the strain
caused by a gradual influx of all of these illegal immigrants, and
America is a wealthy country. Because the cost of returning these
immigrants would be so daunting, the process would have to be
done gradually, over a significant period of time, and presumably,
with financial aid from America.
Finally, illegal immigrants who must hide in society are prey to
the unscrupulous. They are extorted, forced into slave labor
60
conditions, live in fear, and are abused. Those preying on illegal
immigrants know that they have no recourse because of their illegal
status. Not granting amnesty is part of what contributes to the
increase in crime and human suffering. Gang members and
criminals, however, are among the illegal immigrants coming to
the United States. Granting amnesty to these illegal immigrants
only creates further problems.
V. FINANCES OF IMMIGRATION
A. Education
Immigration, both legal and illegal, has accounted for the
national increase in public school enrollment over the last two

60. The Abuse of Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E1D9123BF931A15754C0A
961958260.
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61

decades. Indeed, “[i]n 2005, there were 10.3 million school age
62
children from immigrant families in the United States.”
63
Moreover, immigrants generally have lower incomes than natives,
so their tax contributions are unlikely to entirely offset the costs
they impose on schools. This is especially true because of the
higher costs associated with teaching children whose first language
64
is not English.
B. Poverty
The poverty rate for immigrants and their children under
eighteen who are born in the United States is 18.4 percent, which is
57 percent higher than the 11.7 percent for natives and their
65
children. Immigrants and their minor children currently account
66
for about one in four persons living in poverty.
Current data
indicates that there is an enormous variation in poverty rates
67
among immigrants from different countries.
C. Uninsured for Health Care
In addition to the high poverty rates among illegal immigrants,
about 34 percent of illegal immigrants and their minor children
68
The U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants,
are uninsured.
61. See Note, Federal Funding for Newcomer Schools: A Bipartisan Immigrant
Education Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 799, 800 (2007) ("[A]mong children,
immigrants constitute the fastest growing group"); U.S. Population and Immigration:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 24–28 (2001) (statement of Steven A. Camarota, Director of
Research, Center for Immigration Studies), http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/
74238.pdf.
62. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade, supra note 2, at 2.
63. Facts About Immigrants, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER, July 2004, at
1,
http://caimmigrant.org/repository/wp-content/uploads/2006/08/Immigr
FactsNILC0704 .pdf; See Hardships Among Children of Immigrants: Findings from the
1999 National Survey of America’s Families, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, NEW FEDERALISM:
NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN FAMILIES, SERIES B., NO. B-29 (FEB. 2001),
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf_b29.pdf.
64. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 252 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]here can be no doubt that very large added costs will fall on the state or its
local school districts as a result of the inclusion of illegal aliens in the tuition-free
public schools.”).
65. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade, supra note 2 at 20.
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. For example, the poverty rate for Mexicans is 26.4 percent—more
than five times that of persons from Canada or the Philippines. Id.
68. Id. at 16.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/4

16

Black et al.: Is the IRS the Solution to Illegal Immigration?

2008]

IRS: IMMIGRATION SOLUTION?

325

however, can enroll in Medicaid, and almost 47 percent of
immigrants and their children either have no insurance or have
69
insurance provided to them through Medicaid. The widespread
reliance upon Medicaid ultimately creates a huge burden on health
70
care costs.
D. Welfare
71

While
The use of welfare varies by country of origin.
immigrants from refugee-sending countries, such as Russia and
Vietnam, tend to fully utilize the United States’ welfare system,
Mexican and Dominican households use welfare at an even higher
rate, and virtually none of the Mexican or Dominican immigrants
72
are refugees. Illegal immigrants account for a large share of the
overall low-income population, and a large share of illegalimmigrant households use the food assistance programs and
73
Medicaid. In general, illegal immigrants cannot use the welfare
system themselves; however, their children born in the United
74
States can be enrolled in Medicaid and receive food assistance. In
addition, many illegal immigrants have low incomes, and as a
75
result, their children can enroll in means-tested programs. Giving
amnesty to illegal immigrants will increase the availability of welfare
programs to those who otherwise do not qualify.

69. Id.
70. Paul Fronstin, The Impact of Immigration on Health Insurance Coverage in the
United States, EBRI NOTES, VOL. 26, NO. 6 (Employee Benefit Research Institute,
Wash., D.C.) June 2005, at 6, http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_Notes_062005.pdf.
More than 11 million immigrants in the United States were uninsured in
2003, accounting for 26.1 percent of the 44.7 million uninsured
individuals in the country. Immigrants accounted for about one-third of
the increase in the uninsured between 1994 and 1998, but between 1998
and 2003 they accounted for 86 percent of the growth in the uninsured,
presumably because PRWORA [Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996] restricted their benefits under
public assistance programs for five years after they entered the United
States. To the degree that immigration continues to increase, it is likely
that the uninsured will also continue to increase as a proportion of the
population.
Id. at 1.
71. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade, supra note 2, at 18.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1, 18.
74. Id. at 16.
75. Id. at 17.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

326

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

E. Taxes, Payroll Taxes, Earned Income Tax Credits
Tax benefits for illegal immigrant workers presents another
significant issue. With an annual cost of over $30 billion, the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the nation’s largest means76
tested cash assistance program for workers with low incomes.
Native-headed households make up 15.8 percent of those
households that qualify for the credit, compared to 30 percent of
77
immigrant households.
Making illegal immigrants legal will
increase the number of qualifying immigrant households.
It is assumed the collection of back taxes, with penalties and
78
interest, would generate billions of dollars for the IRS. Whether
illegal immigrants would be subject to the income tax, however, is
79
an unanswered question.
F.

Lost Jobs

There are millions of native-born Americans employed in
80
occupations that have high concentrations of immigrants. It is
simply not correct to say that immigrants only do jobs natives do
not want. If that were true, then there should be occupations
comprised almost entirely of immigrants. The occupational
categories of farming/fishing/forestry, construction, building,
cleaning/maintenance, and food processing currently employ 15.3
81
million adult native-born Americans, yet these occupations are all
areas in which illegal immigrants hold jobs that Americans do not
purportedly want. Further, while employers often argue that there
are no Americans available to fill such jobs, there are 1.8 million
unemployed natives in these job areas, and native unemployment

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Michael Kranish, Bush Removes Provision Requiring Back Taxes from Illegal
Immigrants, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 2007, http://www.boston.com/
news/nation/washington/articles/2007/05/19/bush_removes_provision_requiri
ng_back_taxes_from_illegal_immigrants/.
79. Compare Shikha Dalmia, Illegal Immigrants are Paying a Lot More Taxes Than
You Think, REASON FOUNDATION, May 1, 2006, http://www.reason.org/
commentaries/dalmia_20060501.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2008), with Steven A.
Camarota, The High Cost of Cheap Labor: Illegal Immigration and the Federal Budget,
CENTER
FOR
IMMIGRATION
STUDIES,
Aug.
2004,
at
24–25,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2004/fiscal.pdf [hereinafter Camarota, The High Cost
of Cheap Labor].
80. Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade, supra note 2, at 13.
81. Id. at 12.
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82

averages 10.8 percent in these occupations.

VI. NET EFFECT OF LEGALIZING ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
Based on the foregoing, offering amnesty as a solution or
partial solution to the issue of illegal immigrants who are already in
the United States would have far-reaching financial effects. The
estimated net fiscal costs to the federal government of amnesty for
the illegal immigrants in the country would increase from $2736 to
83
$6022 per household per year. Based on Census Bureau data,
when all taxes are paid (direct and indirect) and all costs are
considered, illegal immigrant households created a net fiscal deficit
84
at the federal level of more than $10 billion in 2002.
It is
estimated that, “if there [were] an amnesty [program] for illegal
[immigrants], the net fiscal deficit would grow to nearly $29
85
billion.”
On May 23, 2007, the Congressional Budget Office released its
preliminary estimate of the cost of Senate Amendment 1150, the
substitute for S. 1348, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act
86
87
The new estimate put the cost at $17 billion.
The
of 2007.
estimate, however, contains the following caveats:
CBO and JCT estimate that enacting S. Amdt. 1150 would
increase federal direct spending by $13 billion to $17
billion over the 2008-2012 period and by $32 billion to
$38 billion over the 2008-2017 period. Over the 10-year
period, about 4[%] of those totals for direct spending
would be for Social Security benefits, which are classified
as off-budget. The single largest component of the
expected direct spending is for outlays from refundable
88
tax credits, estimated by JCT.
and
CBO and JCT estimate that enacting the substitute
amendment would result in a net increase in federal
revenues of $15 billion to $19 billion over the 2008-2012
82. Id. at 13.
83. Camarota, The High Cost of Cheap Labor, supra note 79 at 32.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id.
86. Letter from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to
Senator Kent Conrad, Chairman, Senate Budget Committee (May 23, 2007),
available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8141/05-23-Immigration.pdf.
87. Id. at 1.
88. Id.
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period and a net increase of $70 billion to $75 billion over
the 2008-2017 period. Increased revenue from Social
Security payroll taxes, which are classified as off-budget
account for most of the changes in revenues over the 1089
year period. . . .
This means that the largest component of the $13 to $17
billion increase in spending is refundable tax credits and most of
the revenues are payroll taxes. Without the payroll tax increase,
the CBO would predict a large price tag to this or another similar
bill.
VII. THE TAX LAW: A SOLUTION TO THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM
One of the big issues related to illegal immigration is the fiscal
cost of immigration. With the estimated cost of $6000 per illegal
90
immigrant household, determining who should pay these costs is
an issue of serious contention throughout the nation.
Employers are tempted to hire illegal or undocumented
workers because they can pay them less than they would have to pay
U.S. citizens or legal immigrants. For example, in an industry
which pays only wages and no benefits, $20,000 of net pay costs an
employer $26,762. That includes $2958 of income taxes to the
employee, $1541.32 of Social Security Tax each for the employee
and employer, and $360.47 of Medicare tax each for the employer
and employee. There may also be state employment costs and
worker’s compensation costs added to those figures.
Judged solely from the employee’s perspective, that is $12.43
an hour of advertised wages, and $10.00 per hour of net wages.
From the employer’s perspective, it turns out to be $13.38 an hour
before taxes. Assuming a corporate employer in the 34 percent tax
bracket, the after-tax cost to the employer is $8.83 an hour. If the
same employer were employing illegal immigrants, however, the
cost would be $10.00 per hour before taxes and $6.60 after taxes
(income and payroll). This represents a 25 percent savings to the
employer, which has led to an increase in U.S. employers that are
willing to hire illegal immigrants. The availability of jobs has
attracted many illegal immigrants to this country for work. Thus, it
is the U.S. employers that have profited, and presumably, it is the
employers who should pay for the solution.
89.
90.

Id.
Camarota, The High Cost of Cheap Labor, supra note 79, at 9.
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A. Taxation of Illegal Immigrant Wages
1.

Basic Principles

One resource has been overlooked in the efforts to find a
solution for the overwhelming problem of illegal immigration. The
hiring of an illegal immigrant is an illegal activity, and operating an
illegal activity is subject to tax just like the operation of legal
activities. The ordinary and necessary expenses of operating a
91
business apply to both legal and illegal businesses. Thus, illegal
activities are still subject to tax, and illegal businesses are allowed to
deduct all of the ordinary and necessary business expenses under
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 162 that legal businesses can
deduct.
However, the courts developed the principle that a payment in
violation of public policy is not a necessary expense and is not
92
deductible. This was generally used to disallow a deduction for
any payment that the IRS felt violated public policy. However,
Congress decided to limit the use of this power to include only
fines, penalties, bribes, kickbacks, and violations of the United
93
States’ antitrust laws.
In foreign countries, disallowing a deduction is limited to
those deductions that violate the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
94
Act of 1977. In the past, these limitations have not been used to
disallow deductions for the wages paid to illegal immigrants. If the
wage payments were held to be in contravention of public policy,
these limitations could apply.
§162(c)(2) Other Illegal Payments -No deduction shall be
allowed under subsection (a) for any payment (other than
a payment described in paragraph (1)) made, directly or
indirectly, to any person, if the payment constitutes an
illegal bribe, illegal kickback, or other illegal payment
under any law of the United States, or under any law of a
State (but only if such State law is generally enforced),
91. Comm’r v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958) (holding payments made to
employees as wages and to the landlord as rent are “ordinary and necessary
expenses,” and allowing those payments to be deducted unless the deduction is
made to “avoid the consequence of violations of a law.”).
92. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Comm’r, 356 U.S. 30 (1958) (holding a
payment that violates public policy is not deductible).
93. I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g) (2000).
94. Id. § 162(c).
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which subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss
of license or privilege to engage in a trade or business
[emphasis added].
Under section 162(c), a payment to any person is not
deductible if it is an illegal payment under the laws of the United
95
States or the laws of any state, including the District of Columbia.
In general, the payment itself must be illegal to be disallowed as a
deduction. For example, wages and rents paid in connection with
96
If the wage itself is illegal,
an illegal business are deductible.
however, the deduction would not be allowed. According to the
Code, the law must subject the payor to a criminal penalty or the
loss of a license or privilege to engage in business. In addition, a
state law must be “generally enforced” in order for the illegal
97
payment to be nondeductible. Fortunately, there is no corollary
provision for required enforcement of federal laws.
98
In Wood v. United States, a taxpayer was required to pay income
taxes on income received from contraband activities, even though
all the proceeds from the illegal drug transaction were forfeited by
99
the taxpayer to the government. Although the forfeited money
was properly classified as a loss, the loss was nondeductible due to
the sharply-defined national policy against the possession and sale
100
of illegal drugs.
The INA currently provides for both civil and criminal
101
The criminal penalties only apply to employers.
penalties.
Presumably, IRC section 162 could be used to disallow the
deduction for wages paid to illegal immigrants, but whether IRC
section 162 would disallow the total wage deduction for all
employees is subject to debate. For example, if only the wages paid
to illegal immigrants were not allowed, it would place a greater
burden on the IRS with less benefit, and there would be little
possibility of any strong disincentive for employers to hire illegal
immigrants. An employer is better off paying a smaller wage to an
illegal immigrant even if he cannot deduct it. Alternatively, it
would make the job of the IRS easier and would be a stronger
disincentive to employers to hire illegal immigrants if the IRC
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b) (1975).
Sullivan, 356 U.S. at 27.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)(3) (1975).
Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id. at 421–22.
See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(e) (2000).
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disallowed all deductions for wages once any of the wages were
tainted. At the very least, once an illegal worker is found, the
burden of proof should shift to the employer to prove the portion
of the wages that are legal.
2.

Denial of Wage Deductions or Denial of All Deductions

The IRS Statistics of Income for the year 2004 show that for
the 5,557,965 corporate tax returns filed, wages accounted for only
9.5 percent of the over twenty-two trillion dollars reported as
102
receipts.
The statistics also show, however, that of the total
receipts of $22.7 trillion, the total deductions amounted to $21.6
trillion. Thus, disallowing all wages is only a small disincentive for
businesses.
B. Amending The Code Could Be A More Effective Fix
1.

History

The tax code has been used in other areas to deter crimes that
frustrate national policy. There is an exception to deductibility for
103
amounts incurred in the operation of illegal drug trafficking.
Drug dealers are not allowed a deduction for ordinary and
104
necessary business expenses. They may, however, reduce the cost
105
of sales by the cost of goods sold.
Gross income is defined as
106
“total sales, less the cost of goods sold.” Thus, while section 280E
prohibits any deductions for drug dealers, it does not modify the
107
normal definition of gross income.
The strong public policy
against drug dealing supports the provision denying all ordinary
and necessary business expenses to drug dealers, and this, in turn,
suggests a unique solution to the problem of illegal immigration.
2.

New Code Section 280I

New Code Section 280I could be enacted in a manner similar
102. SOI Tax Stats - Table 5 - Returns of Active Corporations, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=170691,00.html (last
visited Sept. 19, 2008).
103. I.R.C. § 280E.
104. Id.
105. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (2008).
106. Id.
107. See id.
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to section 280E to provide that any business hiring illegal
immigrants would be denied all tax deductions including all wages.
The effect of such a change could not only put a stop to illegal
immigration, and possibly even reverse the flow, but could have it
paid for by the big businesses that created or at least exacerbated
the problem.
The IRC provides that the income from illegal activities can be
reduced by deductions for ordinary and necessary business
108
expenses.
No deductions, however, are allowed for illegal drug
109
110
activities, but the income is reduced by the cost of goods sold.
If the IRC were modified to deny all deductions of employers who
hired illegal or undocumented immigrants, the finances of the
situation would change dramatically. Consequently, businesses
would lose all their deductions (not just wages) if caught hiring
illegal immigrants. Further, the cost of enforcement would
become an opportunity cost.
The IRS collects information for a significant number of
people and businesses, and because law enforcement agencies
generally know the companies who hire illegal immigrants, the IRS
could simply move in on those companies that are in violation. It
would be a huge source of revenue for the government if finding
illegal immigrants on the payroll precluded all deductions.
Moreover, if businesses knew that the possibility existed to have all
tax deductions disallowed, their incentive to hire illegal immigrants
would be diminished. In addition, the IRS is already in place with
investigative and prosecutorial powers. With a change in the IRC,
the IRS could collect from the businesses hiring illegal immigrants,
and could prosecute those who break the law.
Giving the IRS the authority to enforce tax provisions aimed at
curtailing the hiring of illegal immigrants could result in additional
tax revenues and criminal penalties. The new IRC section 280I
could read as follows:
EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE
HIRING OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
No deduction or credit shall be allowed for any amount
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on
any trade or business if such trade or business (or the
activities which comprise such trade or business) consists
108.
109.
110.

Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (2008).
I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (2008).
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3(a) (2008).
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of hiring or employing illegal immigrants in any capacity.
In addition, if illegal immigrant wages constitute part of
cost of goods sold, all wages which are a part of cost of
goods sold shall also be disallowed.
VIII.

EFFECTS OF A CHANGE IN THE TAX CODE

The United States’ “voluntary” tax compliance situation is a
strong advantage to having a change in the tax code. With just a
0.5 to 2 percent audit rate, the great majority of us comply with the
tax provisions. One would expect that the threat of a disallowance
of all deductions would be a sufficient disincentive to impose
voluntary non-hiring of illegal immigrants by many companies.
Therefore, some compliance would be expected just from passing
the law. While some believe that tax expenditures represent
deviations from the ‘normal income tax’ and simply create
spending for the benefit of favored groups, it is worthwhile to ask if
the tax code is “an efficient and equitable means by which to
accomplish the stated goal, even if that particular goal is one that is
111
It is important to note that we need to slow the
well-accepted.”
flow of illegal immigration and encourage those who are here
illegally to return to their native country. Still, we need to
accomplish our goals in a systematic and orderly way without
creating a crisis. Using the IRS can help decrease the flow of illegal
immigration into the United States.
A. Using the Internal Revenue Service
The IRS can help decrease the flow of illegal immigration into
the United States and encourage those who are here illegally to
return to their native country. The IRS can help accomplish this
goal in a systematic and orderly method without creating a crisis.
The advantage of using the IRS is that the IRS can control, at least

111. Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and
Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 711 (2002).
In principle, the very introduction of the tax expenditure process should
be designed to encourage fiscal and legislative restraint for Congress by
attaching a cost to every tax preference. However, the opposite result
occurs because these incentives attain budget priority subject to reduced
scrutiny simply by virtue of their placement in the tax code.
Id. at 715. Precisely because they are not subject to the same scrutiny as direct
programs by reason of their administration through the tax code, such
preferences raise significant policy issues.
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to some extent, the intensity with which companies are audited,
and therefore, can control the number of illegal immigrants being
deported. What the IRS cannot completely control is the impact of
compliance. For example, if the IRS were to audit a very large
multinational firm, and disallow all the deductions because the
firm hired illegal immigrants, this could cause a colossal impact on
jobs for illegal immigrants in other companies and other industries,
and the effect would remain unknown.
The IRS also insures compliance of individuals by arresting an
occasional “high profile” individual—or even a low profile
individual if the community is small enough. The effect pushes
non-compliers back into compliance, and confirms the viability of
the system. There are more than ten million illegal immigrants
112
employed in the United States, making it likely that a significant
number of companies are not in compliance with the law.
Presumably, a small enforcement rate could have significant impact
that could send a clear message to those thinking of crossing the
border illegally to find work in the United States. In addition, it
would have a large but incalculable impact on those illegal
immigrants who are now working in the United States. While the
United States should strive to create a voluntary emigration, it
needs to be accomplished in an orderly manner, without creating a
humanitarian crisis.
B. Severance Pay In Lieu of Disallowance of Deduction
To help create a voluntary emigration while alleviating a
humanitarian crisis, the new tax provision could be coupled with a
severance pay option that would provide a phase-in of the tax
provision for any company providing a severance pay option to its
illegal employees. If those employees are fired, the employer
would provide an amount sufficient to allow them to return to their
country with some money to reestablish a new life. In addition, the
company would also pay to safely return the employee to his or her
home country. Thus, the burden would still be on the company,
but the burden would be less than a disallowance of all deductions.
For companies unwilling to provide the severance package, the IRS
could simply enforce the existing immigration laws. The phase-in
could be done over a period of three, five, or seven years, allowing
a gradual outflow of illegal immigrants. In addition, the severance
112.

Camarota, Immigrants at Mid-Decade, supra note 2, at 2.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/4

26

Black et al.: Is the IRS the Solution to Illegal Immigration?

2008]

IRS: IMMIGRATION SOLUTION?

335

pay and costs could be deductible.
Having the companies who hire illegal immigrants actually pay
to return the immigrants to their own countries accomplishes
several goals. First, a humanitarian crisis will be diverted. Second,
money will be saved from avoiding the costly deportation and
detention proceedings. Third, this theory would serve as a check
on the power of the IRS to audit and assess taxes on gross income
because the company could choose whether to pay the tax or
return the illegal workers to their home country. Presumably, the
lack of new jobs, the outflow of existing illegal immigrants, the
collection of additional taxes to secure the border, and the
enforcement of our immigration laws should start a positive trend
toward workable immigration, and the firing of illegal immigrants
would provide new jobs for the unemployed in those occupations.
C. Efficiency
Unfortunately, tax compliance is always an area of concern.
Through a balance of civic duty (everyone should contribute), fear
of prosecution, and conservative economic analysis (the cost of
non-compliance is high), taxpayers compute their tax obligation,
file a return, and pay the tax. Imposing a penalty through denial of
deductions could serve to undermine the system. Imposing a tax on
employers of illegal immigrants could cause problems with
113
corporate tax compliance.
Alternatively, one commentator has suggested, “[c]learly,
norms in the tax area pull both in the direction of compliance and
against it, suggesting that norms do not operate very strongly,
114
The corporate tax compliance scheme is already rife
overall[.]”
115
with mistrust and cheating. Thus, additional potential penalties
will probably have little impact on compliance.
D. Advantages of Utilizing the Code
There are four advantages of imposing a loss of all deductions
for those businesses that employ illegal immigrants.
113. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 339–
40 (2001).
114. Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under the Income
Tax, 81 IND. L.J. 539, 577 (2006).
115. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR
TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE (Portfolio
2003).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 4

336

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 35:1

Ease

As opposed to other schemes to combat illegal immigration,
this solution is the easiest, at least in terms of initial
implementation. With a stroke of the pen, the penalty would be in
place and there would be an immediate notification of the
potential penalty to the public, the preparers, and special interest
groups. The press coverage alone would be extensive, and the
resulting clamor in business circles should lead many businesses to
curtail the practice of employing illegal immigrants. This, in turn,
should have two effects. First, the number of jobs available to
illegal immigrants, coupled with the negative stigma attached to
hiring such individuals, should reduce the numbers of illegal
immigrants in these businesses. Second, those jobs formerly held
by illegal immigrants would quickly become available to citizens
116
and legal immigrant workers.
These results should have no direct enforcement costs, as the
more risk-adverse businesses would “voluntarily” curtail their illegal
activities without government intervention. However, there could
be indirect costs associated with a larger number of unemployed
illegal immigrants primarily due to increased social services and
welfare expenditures. Some of those costs would be offset by a
voluntary emigration due to loss of jobs.
2.

Enforcement

In comparison with other suggestions, using the tax code to
combat illegal immigration actually increases the likelihood of
enforcement. When considered in connection with the changes to
section 7623, the number of government auditors should not rise,
while the number of private individuals hoping for a
whistleblower’s reward may increase.
Conducting a tax audit of a business suspected of hiring illegal
immigrants may, depending on the number of employees, be labor
intensive. Sorting through the hiring records and W-8 forms of
thousands would be time consuming. If the IRS were required to
verify every illegal employee to reduce the deduction, it could
reduce enforcement. If the code were written to disallow all
116. After the Swift meat packer’s raid, the illegal immigrants who were
rounded up were replaced within the week by legal workers. Randall Parker, Illegal
Alien Meat Packing Plant Raids Raise Wages, PARAPUNDIT, Dec. 23, 2006,
http://www.parapundit.com/archives/003974.html.
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deductions if any illegal immigrants were found, however, the
amount of work would be substantially reduced, and the process
would end upon finding one illegal immigrant worker. Last,
businesses would then be required to report gross income without
deductions, and the audit would be over.
If all deductions are disallowed when any illegal immigrants
are found, the burden of proof shifts to businesses. Thus, the
business, not the IRS, has the burden of proving it did not hire any
illegal immigrants. Since the magnitude of the penalty is so great
due to disallowance of all deductions when one illegal immigrant is
found, this makes a good argument for coupling the provision with
an option to provide a severance package to the illegal immigrant.
This severance package would require the employer to return the
illegal immigrant to his or her native country with some money to
start a new life. The result would be beneficial for the illegal
immigrants and would be less detrimental to the business provided
the numbers of illegal immigrants was small in comparison with its
total deductions.
3.

Fear

Arguably, those businesses currently hiring illegal immigrants
are not concerned with the prospect of prosecution. This may be
due to several factors, including the lack of significant prosecutions
in the past, the low likelihood of detection, or the supposed
sympathy a jury trial may bring. But it is another story altogether
for a business to deal with the IRS. Fear of an audit which could
result in the disallowance of all deductions or criminal prosecution
raises the stakes for businesses which choose to employ illegal
immigrants.
4.

Whistleblowing

Section 7623 of the Internal Revenue Code and its regulations
allow the IRS to pay a reward from amounts collected “to anyone
who provides information that leads to the detection and
117
punishment of anyone violating the internal revenue laws.”
Section 7623(b) was recently added for large cases in which the
collected amount is greater than $2 million. The reward in those

117. I.R.S. Publication 733 (Rev. Oct. 2004), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p733.pdf.
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118

cases will be between 15 percent and 30 percent.
The new
legislation provides that payments to qualified whistleblowers are
mandatory, and it permits whistleblowers to appeal the IRS award
determinations to the Tax Court.
If they are successful,
whistleblowers will be permitted to take an above-the-line
deduction for attorney’s fees and costs they paid to recover their
award. In addition, the statute places a ten percent cap on awards
to whistleblowers in cases where there have been prior public
disclosures of their allegations.
In 2003, the IRS paid out $4 million to informants who helped
the IRS pursue 190 cases, and recouped more than $61 million in
119
taxes owed.
The IRS statistics show that the agency has paid an
average of 2.74 percent of recovered taxes for rewards to
120
The agency already conducts audits of
informants since 1967.
and maintains information about the employers providing jobs to
illegal immigrants, and the availability of whistleblower awards
makes detection of those businesses more likely.
IX. CONCLUSION
At this time, it is generally accepted that the issue of illegal
immigration is an extremely divisive topic in the United States.
While the proposals for dealing with the topic vary widely, one
thing is certain—the fix is going to be costly.
Using the IRS and amending the IRC has not been one of the
proposals to remedy the problem. Amending the IRC, however,
provides an interesting opportunity; it may provide a solution and
the funds to implement it by simply enforcing our existing
immigration laws and increasing the economic cost of breaking
those laws. By changing the IRC to deny ordinary and necessary
business deductions to companies who hire illegal immigrants,
voluntary compliance with the immigration laws may increase due
to the financial cost of non-compliance. The companies that refuse
to comply could be audited and their deductions denied, resulting
in a huge influx of tax dollars.
Because denying deductions could be catastrophic for
118. Paul D. Scott, Whistleblowers Wanted, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY, May 2007,
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/may2007/taxpractice.htm.
119. Jeff Schnepper, IRS Pays Informants To Squeal On Tax Cheats, MSN.COM
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes/Avoidanaudit/P42263.asp
(last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
120. Id.
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companies, during a phase-in period companies would be given the
option of providing a severance package for the illegal aliens who
were being fired or paying taxes without deductions. The severance
package would pay for the aliens to return to their native country.
This would help to avert a humanitarian crisis caused by mass
deportation, and would be less of a burden on the companies.
Since it is generally believed that most illegal immigrants come
to this country for a new life and a higher paying job, the
employers who have provided those jobs should bear the cost of
returning the illegal immigrant to their native countries. Thus,
instead of America bearing the cost of deportation, the employer
should bear the cost, and presumably, the process to deport the
illegal immigrant will be less time consuming.
There are already numerous sources of information to find the
companies who are breaking the law. Law enforcement and civic
leaders in several locations around the country already provide
places for illegal workers to gather to be picked up for work by the
companies that hire them. Social Security mismatch records
provide clues. The whistleblower provisions of section 7623,
including the 2006 amendments, make it financially rewarding for
individuals to turn in employers who employ illegal aliens.
If the United States is serious about controlling illegal
immigration, the demand for illegal workers must be decreased.
The government needs to raise funds for closing the border,
deporting illegal workers, and maintaining an effective
enforcement infrastructure. It is advantageous for the government
to use the IRS because the IRS already has an experienced
workforce, thus the government would not need to employ
additional people. Further, using the IRS could result in greater
revenue with which to fund immigration reform. In short, because
a major incentive to illegal immigration is the availability of jobs,
using the IRS may be the solution.
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